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A JOURNEY AROUND CONSTITUTIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON CONTEMPORARY
CONS TITUTIONS*
YASH GHAIt
Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong
INTRODUCTION
I am greatly honoured by the invitation from the University of Cape Town
to deliver the inaugural Beinart Lecture. It is a particularly flattering
invitation as my mandate is to reflect on my experiences as a constitutional
scholar and advisor. There have been truly remarkable changes in the ways
constitutions are perceived, prepared and used since I first became interested
in the subject nearly five decades ago. Although I will not be dealing with
South Africa in this lecture, I think it important to state that these changes are
reflected particularly well in South Africa's experience of constitutions,
ranging from the use of constitutions to colonize and then to dominate, and
latterly to liberate. I propose, in a highly personal vein, to reflect on these
changes and to illustrate, where possible, with reference to my own research
or consultancies and personal anecdotes.'
But first let me acknowledge my debt to the South African scholars and
freedom fighters who have inspired our perspectives on constitutional
values. I believe that Professor Ben Beinart was both a scholar and activist in
this tradition. Public law was perhaps not his major speciality, but he was
deeply committed to justice and the rule of law and his research in this area
was instrumental in turning aside the preoccupation with the supremacy of
* Originally delivered as the first Beinart Memorial Lecture at the University of Cape Town on 30
September 2003.
t DCL (Oxon). I want to acknowledge the generous funding by the University of Hong Kong,
including the Distinguished Researcher Award, which has enabled me to make the several constitutional
journeys discussed in this article.
' My practical work on constitution-making and litigation has ranged over Africa, Asia and the South
Pacific; and has concerned, inter alia, independence constitutions (Seychelles, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu), reviews (Tanzania, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Maldives, Zambia, Kenya),
constitutional rehabilitation after coups (Fiji), establishing constitutional orders after prolonged internal
conflict (Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan), facilitating negotiations and consensus in conflict situations
(Papua New Guinea, Nepal, Sri Lanka), advising on the constitutional implications of setting up special
tribunals to prosecute associates of a former dictator (Uganda), advising prime ministers and presidents on
their powers, including dissolution of parliaments (Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands),
establishing systems of autonomy (Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka), litigation on the validity of a coup (Fiji),
habeas corpus petitions (Kenya), validity of nomination for presidential elections (Kenya) and the legality of
a legislature and the validity of laws and budgets passed by it (Samoa). I have also advised some international
organizations and states on human rights issues.
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the legislature. Throughout the dark days of apartheid he never lost his belief
in the capacity of the law to fight injustice and oppression, and South Africa's
new constitution is a full vindication of his confidence in the rule of law. As a
scholar, he believed that the law could not be understood entirely within its
own four comers and that those who sought true understanding were
required to make forays into other disciplines. He influenced generations of
students who went on to become distinguished judges, professors and
practitioners of the law, and his spirit continues to animate the distinguished
constitutional scholars of this University. This lecture is also a tribute to the
scholars of South Africa, and to its wonderful constitution, a watershed not
only for this country but also for many others.
THE ROLE OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWYER
What does a constitutional lawyer do in our times? First of all, I would say that
* if a constitutional lawyer is to assist in framing effective solutions to
contemporary problems facing states and people, his or her role must extend
beyond the conventional approach of concentrating on drafting a text
appropriate to the particular circumstances of a country. Various additional
tasks define the role of a constitutional lawyer in the modem period, in which
the people are recognized as the ultimate source of sovereignty. The role
involves, for example, introducing decision-makers to comparative research
on what has worked (or not worked) in other countries, helping to narrow
down the available options and encouraging broader understandings of
contentious concepts such as self-determination. It may also involve participat-
ing in processes of conflict resolution to open up discussion between people
who have been at war with each other, in an attempt to find common ground
where none may be apparent at the outset. Apart from facilitating negotiations
and suggesting suitable compromises between the positions of different sides,
teaching negotiating skills is also an important task of a lawyer working
towards constitutional solutions. A commitment to democratic procedures is
crucial to identifying and addressing issues in the society in question, and thus
broadening participation forms a further prerequisite for contemporary
constitutional lawyers. Indeed, this has been a key element of my approach to
constitution-making. The role is, however, not nearly as glamorous as I
thought when I was a student: a Lord Radcliffe carving up India to give it
independence and birth to Pakistan, or an Ivor Jennings drafting the
independence constitution of Ceylon from the splendour of a vice-
chancellor's lodge. Today's constitution-maker rubs shoulders with soldiers
and rebels with AK47s, self-confessed killers while roughing it in small and
remote towns, putting himself or herself at considerable security risk, perhaps
because the rebels will not go to the capital for fear of arrest. 2
2 I have to say that some of my earliest engagements did take me to the chandeliered chambers of
Lancaster House in London, the materniy ward of many Commonwealth constitutions. Unfortunately it
has been downhill since then, sometimes sleeping in makeshift accommodation, besieged, when lucky, only
by mosquitoes.
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THE CHANGING OBJECTIVES OF CONSTITUTIONS
The first constitution I encountered, as a child, was the colonial constitution
in the racially mixed and hierarchical society of Kenya, inflicting on the
majority of its people a double subordination: to interests of the empire and
of the white settlers. By the time I was finishing my university studies,
western colonial empires were collapsing and my research as I finished my
undergraduate degree focused on independence constitutions negotiated
with (or more frequently imposed on) local political leaders. I was too young
to play any role in the making of independence constitutions in my country
or its neighbours, but I did advise on preparing and drafting constitutions for
late decolonization in the Seychelles, as well as in Papua New Guinea and
some other island states in the South Pacific. The brief and simple colonial
constitutions, primarily designed to create an authoritarian and undemo-
cratic centre of power, gave way to complex instruments which, overnight,
dispersed power, ushered in democracy, established a regime of human
rights, and created intricate relationships between diverse communities and
races - the very opposite of the colonial system. 3 Not surprisingly, these
constitutions collapsed under their own weight and the impatience of leaders
newly introduced to the grandeur and temptations of power.
These neo-liberal constitutions were replaced either by military rule,
which made little pretence of democracy or the rule of law, or by one-party
regimes, the constitutions of which, it was claimed, were rooted in
indigenous concepts of governance and legality.4 When President Julius
Nyerere transformed Tanganyika/Tanzania into a one-party state, Professor
Patrick McAuslan and I (both young law teachers then at the University of
East Africa, the first law faculty in that region) were asked to recommend
how the constitution could maximize democracy and provide safeguards
within the enveloping layer of a one- party regime. (The new constitution
established the first ombudsman in Africa, competitive elections under the
auspices of the party, and a leadership code which restricted opportunities for
senior officials to engage in private business or corrupt deals.)5 Nyerere was
not, unlike many other advocates of one-party regimes, a power- hungry
politician, and his adoption of a one-party regime was an anxious and serious
search for a political framework suitable to coerce a fragile state and society
into social and economic development, and yet to uphold freedom. 6 Like
many other states (including those in Eastern Europe), Tanzania found that
3 My first book (co-authored with Professor Patrick McAuslan), Public Law and Political Change in Kenya
(1970), examined Kenya's colonial structures for exercise of public power and its complicated
independence constitution- and foreshadowed its collapse.
' Yash Ghai 'Constitutions and the political order in East Africa' (1972) 21 International and Comparative
LQ 403.
s Some of this was a result of our advice. Our memorandum was later published--see Patrick McAuslan
& Yash Ghai 'Constitutional proposals for a one party state in Tanzania' (1965) 1 East African LJ 124.
6 In those early post-colonial years, his emphasis was on development. His more interesting remarks on
the role of a constitution were in terms of constitutions being either 'brakes' or an 'accelerator'. He argued
that the west valued a constitution because it put brakes on power, but what Africa needed was a
constitution to accelerate development, for which safeguards might be an impediment.
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these two goals could not easily be balanced: much less than a monopoly of
power can corrupt absolutely. Lord Acton's aphorism erred, I think, on the
side of understatement.
The opportunism and vagaries of the cold war buttressed military and
one-party regimes, but with the fall of the Berlin wall, the west had less of a
motive, and Russia less of a capacity, to shelter these regimes. The 'harsh'
wind of democracy swept through Latin America, Africa, large parts of Asia,
and eventually Eastern Europe. The constitutional trajectory of states
subjected to the winds of change was not similar in all respects. Some made a
relatively easy transition to liberal democracy (particularly in parts of
Europe), but others became mired in internal conflicts, frequently based on
ethnic differences. Some of the latter collapsed into 'failed' states and had to
be taken into international care as 'protectorates' and subjected to a process of
rehabilitation (Cambodia, East Timor, Guatemala, Namibia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq).7 Others sought the route to constitu-
tional rule through 'consociationalism', 8 forms of democracy and power-
sharing which rejected majoritarianism. Post-modernist thinking challenged
the liberal state, glorifying difference as well as particularistic identities and
fragmenting the political community into self-sufficient groups. The struggle
was no longer over new territory but over the internal division of state
territory, and with it the diffusion of sovereignty. The principle of
self-determination was turned from secession to autonomy. My treatment of
the Hong Kong constitutional dispensation in terms of the notion of 'one
country, two systems' was my first detailed examination of autonomy,
although autonomy has a long lineage. 9 Deng Xiaoping had predicted a
critical role for autonomy to solve world problems - and how right he
was!t0 States that emerged from colonialism soon after the Second World
War (and that had seemed to have achieved some kind of stabihty), like Sri
Lanka and the Sudan, also came under pressure of ethnic and religious claims
- indeed even the much older and liberal Canada had to confront acute
demands from the francophone and the aboriginal peoples.
It is therefore not surprising that the most interesting constitutional
innovations of our times derive from the imperative to accommodate
diversities and plurality of identities, captured in the clich6 of 'unity in
7 My personal experience of the rehabilitation of'international protectorates' was in Cambodia, where I
was consultant to the United Nations; East Timor, where I advised on the structuring of the process of
constitution-making; Afghanistan, where I worked with the Constitution Commission and the United
Nations on the preparation of its new constitution; and Iraq, where I assisted the Constitutional
Commission of the National Assembly.
8 See below under the discussion of'Ethnic constitutions'.
9 Yash Ghai Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law
(1997). I had previously advised on and helped implement schemes of devolution in Papua New Guinea
(analysed in Yash Ghai & AJ Regan Law, Politics and Administration of Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea
(1993)), Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands.
1" Deng's views were expressed to the then British Foreign Secretary, Mr Geoffrey Howe, and appear in
Deng Xiaoping On the Question ofHong Kong (1993) 14. The latest contenders for autonomy is Darfur in
Sudan, whose claim has been advanced by the European Union and other international agencies.
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diversity'. 1 The collapse of the theory of the nation-state, to which this
post-modem preoccupation leads, tends to produce a complex, many-
layered polity with centrifugal effects on the sites of power. At the same time,
economic globalization sucks state power upwards into confederal and
eventually, perhaps, into federal regional structures and international
economic organizations. Not surprisingly, the question 'whither the state? is
on the lips of many. It compels a re-exaination of the functions of a state
when, amidst numerous global and local arms bazaars, it can no longer claim
a monopoly of power and no longer adequately perform the most basic of
state functions, namely providing security to its citizens. The principal
parameters of the economic order extend well beyond state boundaries. State
ideologies are vigorously, and sometimes violently, contested by particularis-
tic claims and interests, for which it is now possible to find support in
international norms. Individual rights have to be balanced with group rights.
But more on this later.
GENERATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS
Colonial constitutions
As the brief overview in the previous section demonstrated, the functions of
constitutions have changed dramatically over the period of my academic and
practical work. Growing up in Kenya, I become familiar with the colonial
constitution, the principal function of which was domination of the colony
and the warding-off of imperial rivals. 12 Economic interests were overriding,
although they found little expression in the constitution, which was designed
to give maximum discretion to the legislature and the executive - both of
which were personified in the office of the Governor. The Governor was the
centrepiece, representing the dominion of the imperial government operat-
ing in terms of the principle of double subordination: the subordination of
the colonial executive to the imperial government and the subordination of
the colonial legislature to the colonial executive. The colonial constitution
could dispense with democratic pretensions but relied to some extent on the
rule of law, less for political legitimacy than to support the market, albeit a
tightly administered market. However, political factors could not be wished
away, since the dialectics of control and appropriation dictated limits to
exploitation and a selective co-option of local elites into the power structure.
(This balancing was less important in Hong Kong than in Kenya, which had
a large indigenous population divided by tribe and religion, prone to
extreme instability if there was too radical a rupture with the previous
political economy. Hong Kong was largely seen as a tabula rasa and its
" Neglected is perhaps the even more important concept of'diversity in unity', for unless there is unity
among diverse groups, there is no diversity.
12 This warding off of fellow imperialist competitors through the manifestation of sovereignty had
parallels in constitution-making in the South Pacific, where Hawaii and Tonga adopted constitutions (with
the help of western advisors) to ward off colonizers: constitutions proved they were a sovereign (and
civilized) people.
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original role was to mediate world trade with China, rather than to generate
production of its own. The colony became the basis of what was essentially a
new settlement and a new society. This probably explains the generally
favourable attitude towards the colonial government which I discovered, to
my great surprise, as an ardent anti-colonialist, when I came to Hong Kong.)
The absence of a bill of rights in colonial constitutions and the refusal of
courts to recognize any overriding constitutional principles meant that the
colonial government was free to organize not only the economy but also
society generally as it wished. The colony was structured on the basis of racial
separation and privilege: races were designated as 'corporate groups' entitled
(or, as was often the case with Africans and Asians, not entitled) to
representation in state institutions or to the resources of the country. The
political community was thus fragmented, not only between different races
but frequently also within races. The pluralistic legal system was the
expression of the separation of ethnic and cultural communities, each subject
to its own personal laws.
Independence constitutions
The independence constitutions of the 1960s were driven by different
considerations, namely the definition and consolidation of state sovereignty,
cutting links to the colonial power and establishing, through the regulation
of sovereignty, rules for the co-existence of different communities which
colonialism had prevented from becoming a nation. The structures of the
state were redesigned to introduce democratic forms of representation based
on a new concept of citizenship, not always equal or universal and also
qualified by differentiation and inequality explicit in customary laws.
The independence constitutions certainly had liberal aspirations: they
borrowed heavily from western constitutionalism, which is based on the
theory of the social contract in which liberties and freedoms of individuals
occupy a place of honour; and in which fundamental concepts of authority,
jurisdiction, rights and obligations, representation, obedience and resistance,
and accountability had been developed. Although the terms of the contract
that give body to a particular constitution may vary between the key
ideologies of the modem western state (reflecting the contingencies of the
times), each constitution's underlying premise is the separation between state
(as the apparatus of government) and civil society (representing social and
economic institutions and processes autonomous of the state). Captured in
the concept of constitutionalism or the rule of law is the belief that the
primary function of a constitution is to limit the scope of governmental
power and to prescribe the method for its exercise, thereby preserving the
autonomy of civil society. In its modem form, the constitution typically
performs these functions through the separation of powers, the incorpora-
tion of democratic principles, and some form of judicial review. The
constitution validates certain fundamental values and, subject to their
overriding supremacy, establishes a framework for the formation of
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government and the conduct of administration. These values are essentially
liberal and market-related, emphasizing individual civil, political and
property rights underpinned by the concept of the equality of all citizens
under the law.
Important roots of this version of constitutionalism are to be found in the
need of capitalism for predictability, calculability and security of property
rights and commercial transactions. The concept of general rules was
particularly well suited to these aims and, in part, the movement towards
general rules was a reaction to special privileges and monopolies accorded in
royal charters and instruments of incorporation. However, there was, and
remains, considerable tension between the needs of capitalism in general and
the desires of individual enterprises or sections of industry, which modem
states resolve in different ways (a dilemma of which the Hong Kong people
are well aware).
It should come as no surprise that the independence constitutional orders
had extremely limited shelf lives. For reasons too complex to explore here,
the newly independent states were characterized more by continuities than
discontinuities in relation to the colonial state. Some called these constitu-
tions charters ofneo-colonialism. This was not entirely fair, for if the logic of
the independence constitutions had been allowed to play out, the colonial
state might well have been transformed. But nationalist leaders who
succeeded the governor were determined to reinvent themselves in the
image of the governor with untrammelled powers. The office of the prime
minister was often replaced by that of the president and colonial laws and
administrative structures were kept intact, the courts refusing to acknowl-
edge the primacy of the constitution over statute. 13 The principle of
gubernatorial rule was taken to its logical extreme when many states
converted themselves into one-party or military regimes and replaced the
previous parliamentary systems with autocratic presidential systems, in which
the president became the new centrepiece of the new political order.
I have elsewhere discussed the western-inspired independence constitu-
tions, using Weberian categories, as examples of a rational-legal state, with
legality as its underlying principle and a major source of legitimacy. 14 In this
kind of state authority is impersonal, deriving from a system of rules that
expresses the purposes for which, and the ways in which, power must be
exercised. The powers of institutions and officials are defined and bounded
by the law, and do not arise from the personal qualities of the office holder.
The obedience of citizens is thus not to individuals but to lawful commands.
Instead, the new leaders transformed the state from rational-legal to
patrimonial. The patrimonial state is characterized by highly personal rule.
The basis of authority is the overarching powers and discretion of the ruler.
Weber discussed two types of patrimonial state: one, normally in a system of
13 explored this transformation in the work cited in note 4 above.
14 Yash P Ghai 'Constitutions and governance in Africa: A prolegomenon' in Sammy Adelman & Abdul
Paliwala (eds) Law and Crisis in the Third World (1993) 51.
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estates, in which the ruler governs through some form of sharing and
delegation of power, in which the forms of delegation need to be secured
against arbitrary infringement, and which thus promotes notions of binding
rules in certain relationships. In the other type, which he called patriarchal
patrimonialism, the ruler governs more directly, without any legal limits on
his powers. The wishes, fears and anxieties of the ruler are paramount
determinants of policy and action, which inevitably results in unpredictabil-
ity. There is no sharp distinction between the public and the private sphere of
the ruler; and there are often raids on the state exchequer. The appointment
and tenure of officials depend upon the grace and favour of the ruler. His
trust and confidence form the key to power and influence and thus promote
court politics, with its attendant intrigues and uncertainty. Although the
confederal and cientalist nature of the politics of numerous, then newly
independent, states may suggest more an estatist than a patriarchal patrimoni-
alism, the trend has been in the latter direction.
The reason for the movement from the legal-rational to the patriarchal is a
compound of many factors, better explicable in Marxist than in Weberian
terms. There is of course the greed of the new rulers, whose principal access
to resources is via the plunder of the state (hence the pervasiveness of
corruption). But there are also more objective and structural factors. One
reason for the failure of constitutions in Africa is simply that they were
expected to carry a much heavier burden than, for example, constitutions in
the west. They were required to inspire a new form of identity, create
national unity out of diverse ethnic and religious communities, prevent
oppression, promote equitable development, inculcate habits of tolerance
and democracy, and ensure a capacity for administration. These tasks are
sometimes contradictory. Nationalism can easily be fostered on the basis of
myths and symbols, but in a multi-ethnic state these are often divisive (as the
conversion of Ceylon to a 'Sinhala' Sri Lanka so aptly, and horrifyingly,
illustrates). Traditional sources of legitimacy may be inconsistent with
modem values of equality. Economic development, closely checked and
regulated under colonialism, threatened order and ethnic peace by produc-
ing mobility and the inter-mingling of communities in contexts where there
was severe competition for jobs and economic opportunities. Democracy
itself, too, can sometimes evoke hostilities as unscrupulous leaders play upon
parochialism, religion and other similar distinctions.
This burden was compounded by the nature of third-world politics.
Although not unattended by violence, the state in the west experienced a
more organic growth than in the third world, where it was an imposition
which not only dominated the economy but was also instrumental in shaping
it. Consequently political factors were relatively more important. In
third-world countries political power is harder to control because, partly as a
result of colonial policies, civil society is weaker and fragmented (which has
often proved congenial to a new government). The western state also
enjoyed relative autonomy from international forces, which facilitated
indigenous control over society and enabled power to be diffused and
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institutionalized to a greater degree. The third-world state not only owes its
genesis to imperialism, but even now its very nature and existence are
conditioned by contemporary economics and politics. Hardly in control of
its destiny, such a state and its people find it hard to institutionalize power on
the basis of general rules, or to resist encroachments upon rights and
democracy, engineered by more powerful states and corporations. The
overthrow of the government ofAllende in Chile by the encouragement and
material assistance of the United States and its corporations is a classic
example. And in many other regions, too, we have seen how the United
States has assisted regimes to trample human rights. When third-world
countries moved to independence, the tools of coercion were readily
available (from cold-war warriors), and made their rulers careless of
cultivating the consent of the ruled.
Constitutions after the fall of communism
One of the most spectacular features of the history of constitutions in the last
two decades has been the near annihilation of communist constitutions. This
is a very large change indeed from the situation in the last quarter of the
twentieth century when nearly half of the world was governed by
communist regimes. My own familiarity with communist constitutions was
through the scholarship of others and through a study of the original texts.
Writing in 1993, I said that the theory of communist constitutions rests on
two bases: the criticism of bourgeois legality and Marxist teleology. Marx
exposed the essential class-based and exploitative nature of the liberal state,
disguised by the discourse of rights and constitutionalism. The bourgeois
constitution itself secured the primacy of civil society through which the
capitalist class dominated the state and the economy. Clearly this would not
do for communists. I wrote that
'unlike bourgeois constitutions which (denying the dynamics of their history) emphasise order and
stability, socialist constitutions (inspired more by Lenin's perspective than Marx's) espouse as their
mission the egalitarian transformation of society. In rum, this requires the dictatorship of the proletariat,
the most progressive elements in society. . ., to break and appropriate the economic, social and political
power of the bourgeoisie. While the bourgeoisie has for long periods used civil society to dominate the
state, the proletariat has little alternative to the use of the state to change civil society, for the communist
revolution vests it with political power but does not change the underlying economic structure.
Communist constitutions therefore become overtly authoritarian instruments of class power. The
relative weakness of the proletariat as a class and the magnitude of the task it faces lead to the denial of
various political and economic rights to members of the erstwhile bourgeoisie and the strengthening of
the state apparatus. The working class must secure domination over and, if necessary, replace civil
society so as to transform it. State power must be unified, so that the separation of powers is abandoned
in favour of the centralisation of power in representative state institutions. This concentrated monopoly
of power in the state body is in turn subject to the supervening authority of the Communist Party,
which owes its existence and powers to a mandate higher than the constitution itself. to history itself'.
I noted a deep contradiction at the heart of a communist constitution-and stated it in the following
way, 'It is thus possible for the liberal constitution to base its legitimacy upon values (such as civil and
political rights) and mechanisms (such as pluralism) internal to itself and thereby become a major
legitimising device for the state and society. The communist constitution (at least in the early stages,
where coercion is written on its face) must seek legitimacy from elsewhere, namely socialist theory. The
A JOURNEY AROUND CONSTITUTIONS 813
very emphasis on these external sources of legitimacy demonstrates the secondary and functional nature
of the constitution, one not particularly appropriate to legitimacy.' 15
It is fair to say that as the People's Republic of China abandons socialism in
favour of capitalism, its political and constitutional system will come under
great stress. If evidence is needed, it comes from Eastern Europe, where the
collapse of the communist regimes came less as a result of an assault by their
opponents as the total lack of legitimacy of the regimes once the basic tenets
of socialism were abandoned.16
My active engagement (as advisor and scholar) with the Constitution of
the People's Republic of China began with my research on Hong Kong's
Basic Law and its foundations in the constitution of the People's Republic. It
was clear to me that no study of the prospects of the Basic Law could be
undertaken without understanding the political and legal system of the
People's Republic, in which it was ultimately embedded. I was struck by the
very different traditions of law and legality, and the judicial function, on the
mainland and in Hong Kong, which boded ill for the autonomy of the latter.
(For this reason I devoted a substantial chapter in my book on the Basic Law
to the mainland constitutional and legal system). The dialectics between the
liberal legalism of Hong Kong and the Leninist 'democratic' centralism of the
mainland would have been a fascinating phenomenon to behold had not the
superior political power of the mainland subdued the technical superiority of
the common law - so much, do I hear you say, for constitutions!' 7 The
many complexities of autonomy, central to self-government, are bypassed as
a result of the supremacy of the Communist Party, under whose dominance
decisions of the central authorities always prevail over local initiatives. Now
China itself is confronted with the fundamental contradictions between its
economic policies and its instinct for political and social control administered
from a tiny centre in Beijing. These contradictions are aggravated by the size
of the population and the territory, unrest among minorities, and rapid
economic and social change. It is unlikely that China will go the way of the
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, for its predominant Han population and its deep
springs of nationalism and patriotism assure its territorial integrity. But
transition to some form of democracy seems inevitable, and also perhaps the
adoption of liberal constitutional artefacts, the separation of powers, spatial
distribution of authority, and judicial review. The pace will, however, be
's Ibid at 57-60.
16 An authoritative book on constitutional changes in Eastern Europe states the following: 'There was no
counter-elite, no theory, no organisation, no movement, no design or project according to whose visions,
instructions, and prescriptions the breakdown evolved... Apart from narrow and rather ineffectual circles
of dissidents that could never effectively break out of their marginal habitat of academic, artistic, or religious
institutions (if not prisons), opposition movements were largely... a product of'the regime's decay rather
than its antecedent cause': Jon Elster, Claus Offe & Ulrich K Preuss (with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting
& Friedbert W Rueb) Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (1998).
17 I explored the rise and fall of the common law in post-transfer constitutional litigation in 'Litigating
the basic law: Principles, interpretation and procedures' and 'The NPC interpretation and its consequences'
in Johannes M M Chan, H L Fu & Yash P Ghai (eds) Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate: Conflict over
Interpretation (2000) 3-52 and 119-214. The book contains many interesting analyses by leading scholars of,
and documents on, the right of abode cases.
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measured, with constitutional changes gradually registering the democratic
transition. It will be an unusual transition, made possible by the very
authority of the present system that is to be tamed.
Constitutions in the new wave of democratization
The majority of one-party or military regimes could not survive the collapse
of the Berlin wall. The newfound zeal in the United States for democratiza-
tion, now released from the imperatives of the cold war, left many a dictator
naked, deprived of the political and material support to continue his regime
of oppression. Under these pressures some countries managed a kind of
transition to what we might call the democratic constitution, seeking at the
same time to cure many of the ills of a bureaucratic and corrupt regime.
Others, under the weight of internal rebellions and civil conflicts, experi-
enced greater difficulties in achieving a transition of this kind and went on a
different trajectory, sometimes being taken into international receivership or
becoming protectorates, the escape from which was to be found in a
negotiated constitution, designed not so much to overcome these internal
divisions as to institutionalize them-what we might call the ethnic
constitution.
I do not want to suggest that these two categories exhaust contemporary
constitutions, but they are the more highly publicized and perhaps the more
interesting ones. The outstanding examples of liberal democratic constitu-
tions are those of East European states. Just as previously the African
independence constitutions were the antithesis of colonialism, the East
European constitutions are now the antithesis of communism. They place a
special emphasis on democratic institutions, based on free and fair elections.
They seek to separate parties and the state, prohibiting direct rule by political
parties - in contrast to the Leninist policy of direct and exclusive rule by the
Communist Party. Some constitutions prohibit the adoption of party
ideologies by the state. The constitution is supreme and has direct
application, unlike the previous position where typically statutes were
required to give effect to the provisions of a constitution. The principal
powers of the state have to be separate. These constitutions establish
constitutional courts with the ultimate power to interpret the constitution
and laws, and to ensure the enforcement of their decisions - a marked
reversal of the communist traditions. The free-market economic system is
guaranteed, generally in explicit terms, and the protection of private
property is strongly upheld. Despite this commitment to the market
economy, the constitutions eschew moral declarations, perhaps mindful of
attempts of the previous regimes to promote the New Socialist Man. They
are extremely conservative, sparse in their scope, and content (in the way of
classical constitutions) with setting up political institutions and letting them
get on with the business of the state.. The path to future social and economic
policies is left open, but what is made clear that they must be consistent with
liberal market economies.
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This European approach shows a great deal of faith in democratic politics,
in contrast with democratic constitutions in Africa and Asia where there is
considerable scepticism about politicians and politics, and hence highly
regulated political systems. The 1997 Constitution of Thailand, drawn up at
a time when the reputation of politicians and governments was at a
particularly low point, provides a good illustration of this approach. Most of
the devices discussed below feature in that Constitution. The key operators
and, one may say, the beneficiaries of democracy, politicians and political
parties, are regarded as the most dangerous enemies of democracy.
Consequently the Constitution defines in considerable detail what the
government may or may not do. What it (and other state agencies) may not
do is largely set out in an extensive bill of rights. Areas of jurisdiction
prohibited to the state (such as, for example, sensitive land issues and the
pursuit of linguistic and cultural rights of minorities) are also defined by
vesting responsibilities for those matters in independent commissions or
other authorities. What the government must do is prescribed in what are
called Principles of State or Directive Principles, which may require the state
to pursue policies of equitable regional development and affirmative action
for disadvantaged communities, to promote all indigenous languages, to
safeguard natural resources, to protect the environment, to ensure access to
courts and to support science and technology. Increasingly, positive
obligations are placed on state agencies by bills of rights where economic,
social and cultural rights require them to ensure to the people their basic
needs.
Another set of provisions aims at preventing the abuse of office by
ministers, legislators and senior administrators. They may be prohibited from
engaging in business, especially that which conflicts with their duties. They
are required periodically to disclose to an independent agency their assets and
liabilities. The conduct of political parties, often the cause of violence and
corruption, is regulated to ensure that their charters and practices are
consistent with fundamental principles of democracy, that they practise
internal democracy, and that their accounts are audited and published to
achieve transparency - on pain of forfeiture of the right to compete in
elections. Thailand goes so far as to establish a second chamber where no
candidate can be a member of a political party. This chamber has been given
critical functions where independence from party politics or the administra-
tion is considered necessary, as in appointments to the electoral commission
and the constitutional court.
Independent commissions are also established to perform sensitive and
critical functions that are essential to ensure open political and administrative
systems. Thus the drawing of electoral constituencies, preparation of
electoral rolls and the conduct of elections are the responsibility of an
independent electoral commission. In some countries the management and
allocations of state land are done by an independent commission. In order to
prevent abuse of the criminal process, prosecutorial powers are vested in an
independent director of prosecutions. Some key elements of monetary
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policy are removed from the ministry of finance and given to an independent
central bank. Various institutions, their independence and resources guaran-
teed under the constitution, are established to deal with complaints against
the administration and to protect people's rights: ombudsmen, human rights
commission, and anti-corruption authorities.
Yet another device is to empower the people and facilitate their
participation in public affairs. The constitution requires the state to disclose
information and reports that it holds. For instance, the freedom of
information provision in the Kenyan draft Constitution obliges the
government to publish and publicize any important information affecting
the nation - this in a country where the government routinely suppresses
reports of comnimissions of enquiry or investigations into charges against
ministers or others favoured by it. The allocation of airwaves is taken away
from the government and given to an independent commission, while
state-owned media are required to provide equal and fair coverage to all
political and social groups. Electors who consider that their MP has failed to
discharge his or her responsibility conscientiously may remove that MP.
Parliament and the administration are required to ensure that opportunities
are given to the people to participate in lawmaking and in decisions that
affect them. Some constitutions, following the Swiss model, give people the
right to initiate legislative proposals for consideration by the legislature. And
to ensure that all these onerous provisions are observed, constitutional or
supreme courts are established with wide constitutional jurisdiction.
As will be obvious, this type of democratic constitution not only reflects
distrust of politicians but also acknowledges the rudimentary nature of the
culture of democracy. In the European democratic constitutions the culture
and practices of democracy are taken for granted, and made the basis of the
constitution. The third-world constitutions seek to make up for the
democratic deficit among politicians and political parties and to promote
democratic habits and practices.
Ethnic constitutions
The most interesting developments for a constitutional scholar have
occurred in political systems which deal with ethnic diversity, and this has
been the main focus of my research and advisory work in the last decade or
so. Today most states are multi-ethnic; and perhaps they always were, but it
was just not acknowledged. Now, under the impetus of globalization,
migrations, rights-consciousness, gender politics, and general suffering, the
question of diversity has forced itself on politicians and policy-makers and
the international community. Broadly, three approaches have contested for
primacy: the hegemonic, the liberal and the consociationalist. 18 In the first,
stability is given to a society by the hegemony or dominance of one ethnic
" See generally Yash Ghai 'The relationship between the state and minorities' in Nanda P Wanasundera
(ed) Protection of Minority Rights and Diversity (2004).
A JOURNEY AROUND CONSTITUTIONS 817
group: examples are whites in apartheid South Africa and pre-independence
Zimbabwe; Jews in Israel; Russians in the Soviet Union; the fatal attempts of
Slobodan Milosevic to carve out a similar dominance of Serbs in the former
Yugoslavia; and the aspirations of fundamentalist Hindus in India. Individuals
acquire and exercise rights as members of communities which are given a
corporate status; and rights are not equally distributed. This approach is now
discredited, although it is not without its adherents.
Liberalism, on the other hand, believes in equal rights of all individuals.
Under a regime of rights and democracy, the state is neutral between persons
and communities - non-discrimination being its fundamental principle.
The state's neutrality is not to be interpreted as hostility to differences in
religion, language, social status or historical traditions. On the contrary, the
liberal state prides itself on its tolerance, indeed celebration, of difference.
But it believes that this tolerance is possible only if these differences do not
intrude on the public sphere. The liberal regime depends on a sharp
distinction between the private and pubhc spheres, and it is in the private
sphere that it sees associational and confessional activities and the pursuit of
sectarian values and cultures. It also considers that individuals and groups
should be free to seek their own version of the good life (as long as they
respect the rights of others), and for this purpose, too, state neutrality
between different conceptions of the good is necessary. This is an attractive
framework but it has come under considerable criticism even from those
who would be expected to support it.
One strand of criticism is that the liberal state does not live up to its claims,
in that the state is centralized, monopolizes power, and aims for uniformity
in law and administration, leaving little space for diversity. More empirically,
it is argued that in practice the liberal state privileges the culture of the
majority community; and there has of course been a close association
between liberalism and the theory of the nation state, which is premised on
the cultural homogeneity of a people, and in which the dominant mode of
political organization and decision-making is majoritarianism, to the obvious
disadvantage of minorities. Others say that liberalism underestimates the
importance of culture to one's orientation and the development of one's
values and moral judgments; or if it does not underestimate it, it tends to
ignore the significance of minority cultures vulnerable to extinction under
modem pressures of the market and the state. 19
Many countries that have been regarded as liberal have had to confront the
rise of ethnicity-based claims to political recognition and participation, each
grounded in its own culture, language, and religion (Canada being an
interesting example which has tried hard to grapple with the typical
dilemmas which liberalism has to face). Developing countries with acute
difficulties of nation-building have had to balance the demands of difference
"9 For a particularly trenchant criticism of the liberal state, see Bhikhu Parekh 'Cultural diversity and the
modem state' in Martin Doombos & Sudipta Kaviraj (eds) Dynamics of State Formation (1997) 177.
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with the imperative of unity, and have had to attempt to transcend ethnicity
through genuinely national institutions. For example, electoral systems are
often designed to create incentives for national rather than regional political
parties and, if the system is presidential, to ensure that the candidate who is
elected president enjoys widespread support in the country, for example by
requiring in addition to a majority vote nationally, specified support (say 25
per cent of the votes) in a specified number of provinces (say 65 per cent) (as
in Nigeria and Kenya). This approach can have an integrative effect. Other
devices to promote a broad nationalism can also be adopted, including
inter-ethnic equity and redress for past injustices (this is the South African
approach).
Those who consider that liberalism cannot do justice to minority cultures
have turned to the consociational approach. Two assumptions underlie
consociationalism. The first, much contested, is captured by the concept of
primordialism, which starts from the presumption of what is often called the
given and irrevocable reality of diverse communities and cultures. It assumes
that cultural, religious and linguistic differences are inborn and define our
very identity and are not susceptible to change. It is therefore better and
fairer to accept these existing differences and identities and build political
structures around them. The second assumption is that it is possible to have a
democratic order in a multi-ethnic state, but that it is necessary to abandon
institutions and procedures of majoritarianism and to make room for forms
of power-sharing which enable each ethnic group to participate in the affairs
of the state. Consociationalism owes a great deal to the intellect and energies
of Professor Arendt Lijphart, who for decades has been arguing its virtues and
elaborating the detailed constitutional framework necessary to achieve it.
Central to this framework is the constitutional recognition of communities
as corporate groups and the bearers of political entitlements. These groups
should have representation in both the legislature and the executive, with
appropriate vetoes to safeguard their key interests and be given territorial,
and where necessary, non-territorial forms of autonomy; and the state should
observe the general principle of ethnic proportionality.20 While the principal
concern of the liberal constitution is to regulate the relationship between the
state and citizens, that of the consociational constitution is to regulate
relations between communities as mediated through state structures.
'Primordialism' is strongly contested by other social scientists, who argue
that cultural differences are not inborn and immutable but are socially and
politically constructed, often by ethnic 'entrepreneurs' who have a vested
interest in politicizing these differences. It would be foolish to institutional-
ize what are temporary and fluid identities - of which there are many in this
post-modern and globalizing world - and to fragment the political
community. The critics also argue that many of Lijphart's institutional
2 I have discussed some constitutions influenced by Lijphart's ideas in 'Constitutional asymmetries:
Communal representation, federalism and cultural autonomy' in Andrew Reynolds (ed) The Architecture of
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (2002) 141.
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prescriptions are prone to instability, as compromises among community
leaders (such as coalition governments) unravel and are ultimately unwork-
able. Despite powerful intellectual attacks, consociationalism is on the rise.
As more and more countries are engulfed in civil ethnic wars accompanied
by horrible atrocities, and the world community gets drawn in, consocia-
tionalism seems to provide a ready fix. Increasingly the demands of
minorities are couched in terms of identity, power-sharing and self-
government, the building blocks of consociationalism. As the focus of the
principle of self-determination shifts from secession to internal democracy,
forms of power-sharing have become salient to that form of democracy.
This approach is manifested in such recent constitutions as those of
Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and (to a qualified extent)
Fiji, where communities are treated as corporate groups and entitled to rights
as such. This separation of communities is reflected in some countries in
separate electoral rolls and reserved seats. The legislature operates through a
complex system of voting, sometimes by all the members voting together,
sometimes by communities voting separately, and sometimes, on sensitive
issues, by combining of the two systems. The form of government is often a
coalition of different communities. Sometimes there is ajoint presidency, an
executive of, say, three persons, with a rotating chair (as in Bosnia-
Herzegovina); and membership of different communities in the cabinet
based on proportionality or fixed numbers. Complex voting systems apply
even in the cabinet. A general principle of proportionality applies to public
service appointments. Where the geographical distribution of population
allows, each community has control over its own region. If this is not the
case, intricate systems of cultural or religious councils are established to
exercise community autonomy cutting across the country. In these systems,
citizenship rights are less important than the entitlements of communities.
Furthermore, there are serious restrictions on mobility from one community
to another, although in certain instances some people are allowed or forced
to designate themselves 'others'. Such constitutions, privileging culture over
a common or secular nationalism, represent a clash between the universal
and the particular. This clash is played out in the dialectics of individual and
group rights. 21
A principal device for accommodating diversity, and one much favoured
by minorities and much resisted by majorities, is autonomy. The demand for
autonomy can arise because a community does not feel part of the wider
political nation (as with the Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the Finnish
islands of Aland, or the Banabans of Kiribati). It can also arise from
disenchantment with the state (as in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamils, the
Southern Sudanese, and the Bougainvilleans seeking independence). My
first major encounter with autonomy was in the designing of the
21 An issue I examine in 'Universalism and relativism: Human rights as framework for negotiating
inter-ethnic claims' (2000) 21 Cardozo LR 1095.
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independence of Papua New Guinea, which consists of the eastern half of
New Guinea island (the other half being part of Indonesia) and a series of
islands. These island communities had not been economically or politically
integrated, and there was little sense of belonging to a wider state formation.
Bougainville felt this most of all, as it was the farthest from the capital and felt
greater affinity to its neighbour, the Solomon Islands. So it demanded, and
the constitutional planning committee recommended, considerable
autonomy for it and other communities which desired it. In the final stages
of the process, the constituent assembly rejected the chapter on autonomy
and Bougainville launched a rebellion. I was asked back as a mediator and the
problem was resolved by the reinstatement of the chapter, somewhat
modified. 22
In 1982, attending a conference on decentralization in Colombo, in the
aftermath of the worst pogrom against Tamils, I had lunch with two old
friends: Lalith Athulathmudali, then Minister of Justice, and Neelan
Tiruchelvam, at the time a leading light in the Tamil United Liberation
Front (a parliamentary group). They asked me if I would produce proposals
on autonomy since this was high on the Tamil agenda. Both liked the
proposals I prepared. Neelan thought that he could persuade his party (then
the principal representatives of the Tamils), and Lalith said that he would try
to persuade President Jayawardena. The next morning Lalith told me that
the president liked the proposals, but that I had first to explain it to key
Buddhist monks. When I met them that evening, they had no disposition to
listen to the proposals but delivered themselves of bitter invective against the
Tamil community. The next morning the president decided not to proceed
with the proposals, which were very modest compared to what the
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelaam are now demanding and which the
government is disposed to concede. This incident reinforces the general
lesson that the rejection of reasonable proposals often leads to violence and
the stakes are upped. Both Lalith and Neelan subsequently became victims of
suicide bombers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
Today there are many examples of autonomy defined as the special
relationship of a part of the country to the whole. Most of these are
successful. 23 However, autonomy of this kind is problematic The autono-
mous area is small and the central authorities govern a large area (for
2 Subsequently, I advised on various aspects of the implementation of this and other parts of the
constitution and reviewed the implementation of autonomy. AJ Regan and I have described Papua New
Guinea's experience of autonomy at length in Ghai & Regan op cit note 9. Autonomy arrangements
secured peace for several years, but in 1988 (twelve years after the initial agreement on autonomy),
Bougainville staged another rebellion which was only resolved in 2001 through negotiations in which
Regan and I were involved. See our joint article, Anthony Regan & Yash Ghai 'Bougainville and the
dialectics of ethnicity, autonomy and separation' in Yash Ghai (ed) Autonomy and Ethnidty: Negotiating
Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (2000) 77. 1 found similar longings for island-based autonomies in
other South Pacific states in which I worked or studied - and some devices adopted for this purpose are
discussed in my paper 'Reflections on self-determination in the South Pacific' in Donald Clark (ed)
Self-Determination (1996) 173.
23 See my paper 'Autonomy as a strategy for diffusing conflict' in Paul C Stem & Daniel Druckman (eds)
International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (2000) 483.
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example, Aland-Finland, Hong Kong-China, Kashmir-India, Puerto Rico-
United States, Zanzibar-Tanzania, Corsica-France). There are often no
strong constitutional guarantees of autonomy. The autonomous area has to
protect itself against larger forces and for this reason, ironically, the much
greater degree of sharing of power through federalism is often more
effective. Self-restraint on the part of the central authorities is critical. This
may be possible when the autonomous area is really small compared to the
overall size of the state (Finland leaves Aland alone, as does the United States
Puerto Rico-most of the time). Hong Kong's small size has, however, been
less protective: it has never ceased to amaze me how much Hong Kong's
politics are tied to the Central People's Government, despite the much
greater degree of Hong Kong's theoretical autonomy compared to these
other examples. But there may be special reasons, including the lack of a
proper concept of autonomy in the constitutional thought of the People's
Republic of China.24
To give a fuller picture of an ethnic constitution, I turn to Bosnia-
Herzegovina ('Bosnia'). Bosnia was a republic in the former Yugoslav
Federation, but unlike other republics, its population was ethnically mixed
with no community in a dominant position. Therefore the solution of
declaring itself as an independent 'national' state (the path chosen by other
republics) was not feasible. Leaders of the three major communities, Serb,
Bosniac and Croatian, incited their followers to violence against others,
partly to drive them out of particular areas where they hoped to form their
own state. The international community had a vested interest in maintaining
Bosnia as a united state, and to achieve this took the sponsors of these
communities in Serbia (including Milosevic) and Croatia to the Dayton
military base in Ohio in the United States to craft a constitution. 25 The
republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is composed of two 'Entities'. One is the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is mainly Bosniac and Croatian
('the Federation'); the other, Republika Srpska, is a Serbian entity. Most
powers are vested in the Entities (in the case of Bosnia, in the constituent part
of the Entity (Bosnia or Herzegovina)), the republic as a whole being left
largely with those powers that are necessary to constitute and exercise
external aspects of state sovereignty. The constitution is built around the
concept of ethnic communities as separate corporate bodies. Arrangements
for representation and power-sharing take the communities as building
blocks, carrying forward the proposition stated in the preamble of the
Constitution that Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are 'constituent peoples' of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'others' and 'citizens' being mentioned only in
passing, which effectively makes these three communities, rather than the
people as a whole, the source and bearers of sovereignty.
24 I argue this point in 'Autonomy regimes in China: Coping with ethnic and economic autonomy' in
Yash Ghai op cit note 22 (Autonomy and Ethnicity) at 242.
21 See Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995.
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The House of Peoples consists of five Croats and five Bosniacs from the
Federation, and five Serbs from Republika Srpska who are elected by voters
of their own conmunities. 26 Nine constitute a quorum, so long as there are
at least three from each community. The other chamber of the Parliamentary
Assembly, the House of Representatives, is constituted on the same principle
and in similar proportions, but with a total of forty-two members. The result
of these arrangements is that politics are entirely communal, and almost
perforce all political parties are ethnically based. Parties get together in
parliament or government only after the elections. The system creates
incentives for parties and their leaders to intensify appeals to narrow ethnic
interests, linked to their kinfolk in other states, which does little for the unity
of the country.27
The constitution also provides for extensive power sharing. The Presi-
dency, in which executive power is vested, consists of three persons, each
chosen directly by one of the three main communities. Decisions are made
by consensus, giving each community a veto. Similar provisions apply for
appointments to other public bodies, including the Constitutional Court and
the Board of the Central Bank. The chair of the legislative chamber rotates
among the representatives of the three constituent peoples. Voting rules
ensure that each of the three main ethnic communities is involved in all
decisions. Any one of them can declare that a proposed decision affects its
vital interests, triggering special procedures for mediation and reconciliation.
If that fails, the matter is referred to the Constitutional Court.
Entity governments are also required to have a proportional ethnic
balance, and the distribution of key political functions is along ethnic lines.
Ironically, in this preoccupation with ethnicity the rights of national
minorities are seriously downgraded or ignored (as is demonstrated by the
restriction of the office of the Presidency to Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs and
by the legislative vetoes accorded to these groups). Rights of citizens, as
citizens rather than as members of particular ethnic group, are also limited.
Given this complex process of decision-making, it is not surprising that
numerous deadlocks have occurred. The national-level government is
seriously handicapped in its capacity to make and execute policy. The
constitution provides a key role for foreigners. Three judges of the
Constitutional Court are foreigners, appointed by the President of the
European Court of Human Rights; and eight of the fourteen members of the
Human Rights Chambers are also from outside. The first governor of the
Central Bank had to be a foreigner, appointed by the International Monetary
2 Article 4.
27 In the 1996 elections, the most extreme ethnic party in each community won, leaving their leaders the
impossible task of finding a common purpose. The OSCE reported that the 2002 elections were relatively
peaceful, and nationalism was a'less overt theme', though still a 'pervasive underlying' factor and there was
more cross-entity political activity. Turnout was low, and the main nationalist party in each community
won the largest share of the vote (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Bosnia and
Hetregovia elections 5 October 2002 Final Report (available at uww.osce.org/documents/dociments/odihr/2003/
01/1188-en.pdf/). Discussions on reform of the constitution, moving away from the dominance of the
ethnic factor, are well advanced.
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Fund. The highest executive and key policy powers are vested in the Office
of the High Representative (appointed in accordance with United Nations
resolutions), the mandate of which covers the monitoring of the implemen-
tation of the Dayton Accord. Owing to differences within the collective
presidency and the unwillingness of any of them to take decisions that might
be resented by his or her community, many matters end up on the desk of the
High Representative who then has to make the decision.
For some, this presents a bleak picture of the future of multi-ethnic states.
For someone like me who grew up with the segregation of races in a colony,
it evokes memories of a colonial society that had little to redeem it. South
Africa resisted being cast into a Lijphartian model as it negotiated its
post-apartheid constitution, while at the same time recognizing the need for
social justice and ethnically based affirmative action. Fiji, which like South
Africa had a colonially imposed racial constitution which persisted well into
independence, made bold but incomplete moves towards a non-racial
constitution in the aftermath of the coups of 1987. Canada has taken several
steps to accommodate the claims of its indigenous people through autonomy
arrangements that sustain traditional modes of governance and tribal society,
as well as through other measures to foster its increasing ethnic and cultural
diversity. All of these measures have involved some breach of classical
liberalism, without a compromise of its essential principles of tolerance and
human rights and national unity. These developments show that liberal
values can be combined with various forms of political and constitutional
recognition of diversity. This, it seems to me, is the way of the future.
CONCLUSIONS
It is time now to bring together the directions and byways of this personal
journey through constitutions. Let me begin with some contrasts between
the classical and contemporary constitutions. I have already stated that the
new European constitutions have a closer relation to the classical than the
new democratic or the ethnic ones. The classic constitutions were content to
set up pohtical institutions; the contemporary are highly interventionist,
seeking to change society and the structure of power. They are inventive and
oriented towards social engineering. Old constitutions were a means of
consolidating and centralizing the power of the state that had been secured in
other ways. The constitution registered class or ethnic victory. The major
triggers for changing the nature and operation of the state, and of politics,
were to come from society. The Constitution of the United States, although
classified as the product of the American Revolution, is for this reason an
extremely conservative document, designed to weaken the capacity of the
state to intervene in civil society. But some revolutionaries fear even this
degree of constitutionalization of power, for they believe that no impedi-
ments should be placed on revolutionary objectives, themselves the source of
legitimacy. Echoes of this debate are to be found in in the Chilean debates
during Allende's access to and exercise of state power on the path to
socialism, with Allende arguing for a democratic path, others opposing him.
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Contemporary constitutions are not based on clear victories. Indeed, they
become necessary because no side has won a clear victory. A particular
feature of contemporary constitutional processes, especially their adoption, is
the role that negotiations over a constitution play in resolving conflict, rather
than making a constitution after conflict has ended.28 A great deal of my own
advisory work in recent years has been of this type. I remember that, in the
conflict between Papua New Guinea and the breakaway province of
Bougainville, the longer we failed to establish a framework for constitutional
negotiations, the more combatants and civilians would be killed. A
constitutional consultant frequently needs a manual on conflict resolution in
his or her kit. Various consequences flow from this role of constitution-
making. First, they are not an imposition, but products of negotiations (in
relation to which a persistent difficulty is the determination of who sits at the
negotiating table: just the warring factions, as in the Sudan, or a wider
cross-section, as is demanded in both Sri Lanka and Nepal?) Secondly, they
are less final or definitive than older constitutions. Constitutions deal with
complex and mutating realities. Frequently, within broadly acceptable
provisions and parameters, they provide the framework for future negotia-
tions and change. The Papua New Guinea settlement gives the people of
Bougainville the option to raise the issue of secession after a suitable period
when the new autonomy arrangements have been given a chance. Thirdly,
because contestants bring not only different claims but also differing sources
of authority and precedent for their claims, the new instrument may rest on
several sources of moral and legal authority, which gives flexibility but also
forces the competing groups to continue their dialogue and consensus-
making (as illustrated in the discussion below on sovereignty). Fourthly,
these constitutions are more delicate instruments than the traditional ones:
the latter were based on dominance well established in civil society and the
economy, and thus less susceptible to counter-pressures. It can be said that
the role of the older constitutions was procedural rather than substantive.
Contemporary constitutions are based on a balance of power, and can subsist
only in so far as that balance is maintained. This kind of constitution is
therefore both more important and more vulnerable than the older variety.
The older constitutions (such as the French, but also the twentieth century
independence constitutions) were based on absolute sovereignty.29 The
function of the constitution was to aggregate and consolidate this sovereignty
against outsiders. In modem parlance, we would say that the constitution is
an act of self-detem-ination, the external aspect of self-determination that
defines itself in relation to other states. Several of today's constitutions are
based on what has been called internal self-determination, and aim to
2 See Vivian Hart 'Constitution-making and the transformation of conflict' (2001) 26 Peace and Change
153.
29 The French Constitution of 1791 stated: 'Sovereignty is one, indivisible, inalienable, and
imprescriptible; it belongs to the nation'. This theory of sovereignty was tojustify the power of the 'nation',
of 'imagined' people, antecedent to the constitution.
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disaggregate state sovereignty into distinct packages (not merely in the form.
of federalism, but also other complex forms of dividing and sharing power).
Once it is accepted that sovereignty lies with the people, not with the
monarch or the party or an ethnic group, it is possible to visualize
sovereignty in dispersed and pluralistic forms. The skill required for
contemporary constitution-making is to diffuse (or perhaps obfuscate)
sovereignty. 30 Indeed, some recent constitutional settlements have been
possible only by keeping open the option of sovereignty: in French New
Caledonia and in Papua New Guinea (both in the South Pacific) and in the
recent settlement for the Sudan, a group has reserved or been granted (the
formulation depending on who you are) the entitlement to exercise the right
of external self-determination (that is to say, secession and separate
sovereignty) after a suitable period (six years or so, which may be interpreted
as a variant of the 1937 Constitution of the Irish Republic which proclaimed
the unity of Ireland, thereby claiming, but at the same time postponing,
sovereignty over Ulster). Sometimes, as in the Northern Ireland of today,
sovereignty is diffused through a form of condominium, or as it is known in
Ireland, co-sovereignty (a solution recently suggested for the conflict in and
over Kashmir). This is another way to say that old constitutions were based
on, or aimed to, establish state nationalism; newer constitutions recognize
and build on difference.
There are many impulses behind the new constitutionalism: the failure of
earlier centralized constitutions; the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe (moving away from statist to market orientation); the collapse of
multinational states, particularly the former Yugoslavia, giving fresh impetus
to the theory of nationalism; post-modernist theory celebrating difference,
defining and protecting specific rather than national identities - a tendency
reinforced by new international rights instruments targeting specific com-
munities such as women and indigenous peoples; reformulations of liberal
theory arguing for the importance of culture and traditions to identity and
self-respect; the increasing heterogenization of populations of states; the
difficulty of maintaining a sovereign centre of power in the face of ethnic
rebellions (assisted by the easy availability of arms and other weapons, small
and large). These are internal pressures but they are not unconnected with
that series of economic, political, technological and social changes, often
externally driven, that pass under the rubric of globalization. These changes
increase the vulnerability and weaken the capacity of the state. Globalization,
with its tendency towards ever larger scales of operations, has forced states to
surrender parcels of sovereignty to regional associations, spectacularly in
Europe, where key indicia of statehood like notes and coins, passports and in
due course even flags, the quintessential symbols of nationhood, are
beginning to disappear.
30 See James Hooper & Paul Williams 'Earned sovereignty: The political dimension' (2003) 31 Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy 355.
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New constitutions are tom between the following two different impulses of
globalization: first, they must respond to greater transnational dependence and
integration (for example, in the European Union transnational constitutions
are superseding national constitutions); and, secondly, state constitutions have
to defer to transnational decision-making, producing a modem form of lex
mercatoria, with private law encroaching upon what were previously regarded
as prerogatives of the state. Furthermore, globalization produces tension
between the imperatives of the market (manifested most clearly in the
constitutions of Eastern Europe) and the commitment to social justice.
Constitutional globalization also has another consequence: it weakens the
state, not only vis-i-vis global forces but also in regard to its domestic
economic constituencies. For the effect of global economic integration is, in
the interests of freer competition, to obliterate the earlier, neater distinctions
between the private and public, the regulation of which comes increasingly
under inter-state regulation. It has also enhances the authority of the executive
vis-i-vis the legislature, and this change in the relationship helps global forces,
for they can more easily bind state executives than legislatures. Aspiring
constitutional scholars would be advised to pay at least as much, if not more,
attention to the charters and practices of the World Trade Organization, the
World Intellectual Property Organization and international financial institu-
tions as to the traditional notions of state sovereignty and the separation of
powers. On the other hand, as discussed above, constitutions (freed by
globalization from the grip of the state) have to accommodate (to use Tully's
expression) the 'strange multiplicity' 31 of the people, principally through
territorial autononies.
There are yet other ways in which globalization affects contemporary
constitution-making. In their constitutions states must respond to develop-
ing international norms, especially as they are embodied in human rights
treaties. They are under pressure to adopt rules of 'good governance'
(although quite what this means is not clear). Experts like me travel hither
and thither purveying their goods. The Internet assists in a massive trade in
constitutional provisions (and I have to confess to some plagiarism myself,
particularly of the South African Constitution!). 32 Constitutions have
become major carriers of values, institutions and procedures around the
world. Constitutions are losing their national specificity (in part because the
problems they are dealing with are similar the world over, which is again a
consequence of the way in which markets and states have developed). But it
is the provisions on human rights that have the greatest tendency towards
universalizing constitutional norms. It is hard to imagine a constitution
drafted today which would not give a place of pride to human rights. For the
most part, civil and political rights are justiciable (and increasingly economic
31 James Tully Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995).
32 And although the Kenyan draft constitution, adopted by the National Constitutional Conference in
2004, has yet to be implemented, its provisions are reflected in new constitutional drafts in Zambia and
Solomon Islands!
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and social rights as well), and therefore rights values dominate the other
provisions of the constitution. The universalizing tendency is reinforced by
judicial practice to rely on decisions of courts of other countries as well as of
international and regional tribunals - even the United States Supreme
Court now deigns to look at the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions - to
the extent that the precise wording is sometimes disregarded in favour of the
'spirit or purpose' of the right. A great deal of this borrowing takes place
without much consideration of cultural or other contextual differences, and
thus we have a new kind of abstraction. But the salience of rights has not
gone unchallenged. In Afghanistan and Iraq there was nearly unanimous
resistance to placing rights above the Sharia. Different formulations were
tried in attempts to find a balance between the Sharia and human rights.
Many Islamic principles are, of course, compatible with the international
regime of human rights, but undoubtedly there are differences on some
points, such as the fact that there is less than full equality for women and
non-believers. The international community (for which read western states)
tried to persuade the Afghanistan Constitutional Commission to give
primacy to human rights treaties (suggesting that the Sharia should be
stipulated merely as a 'source of law'), while the Commission wanted the
Sharia to trump human rights (not merely as the source of law, but as a kind
of Grundnorm). The Commission finally settled for this provision: 'In
Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the
sacred religion of Islam'. 33
Islam is the official religion and non-believers do not have the same rights
as Muslims. But the constitution also commits the state to respect the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights34 and has an impressive bill of rights
(in which the equality provision 35 reads: 'The citizens of Afghanistan -
whether man or woman - have equal rights and duties before the law.')
Islam is concerned more with personal and family affairs than political
matters, and so there is considerable variation in the structures of
government, representing most forms of authority. Culture, often in the
shape of customary laws, is also in some respects incompatible with the
international regime of rights (again to the disadvantage of women). The
constitutions with which the British endowed their colonies in Africa
exempted customary laws from at least the requirement of equality. South
Africa, in its new constitutional dispensation, dealt with the problem by
constitutionalizing customary law but subjecting it to human rights
provisions, a solution that was hard to sell to the Muslim community, and the
recognition of Islarnic law is not dealt with explicitly in the Constitution.
In the course of all this constitution-making fundamental questions arise
about the role and forms of constitutions. It is increasingly accepted that the
widest possible participation of people is necessary to produce constitutions
"3 Afghanistan Constitution 2004, art 3.
14 Article 7.
's Article 22(2).
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that are both relevant and legitimate. Nevertheless, some commentators raise
the risks inherent in such participation, namely that it tends to open up a
large and complex agenda, which may create acute controversies and
overburden the state. 36 Participation may also result in constitutions that the
politicians will reject or negate exactly because such constitutions often seek
to define the purposes of the exercise of state power and make government
accountable and participatory. There is also controversy on how ambitious
the scope of the constitution should be. Those who favour the austere and
brief constitutions of the new European democracies point to the longevity
of the Constitution of the United States, which eschewed a social agenda.
Others argue that in the midst of poverty, squalor and corruption, a
constitution that does not engage with social justice will not serve the
people. Perhaps sparseness of text is possible (even necessary) if the
underlying assumption is an essentially unregulated market. In my work on
the new constitution of Kenya, I was concerned to make fundamental
changes in regard to the structure and orientation of the state, to free it from
the grip of the logic of the colonial state, as well as to respond to the wider
concerns of the people, who, mired in poverty, felt hopelessly marginalized.
Therefore our draft provides for a wide-ranging agenda of social, economic
and political change, in part to counter the pressures and tendencies of
globalization. The politicians did not like the proposed political changes
contained in the draft, and the government is refusing to implement it.
Might it have been wiser to have opted for less radical change and carried the
politicians with us, even if it meant ignoring the people?37
What lesson on the design of the process can be drawn from the highly
participatory process of Kenya (which I chaired for over three years)? The
first point that should be made is that the process empowered people, for we
took them seriously. It greatly increased public knowledge of constitutional
issues. It seemed to strengthen a consciousness of being a Kenyan. It
expanded the agenda for constitutional reform. But such a degree of
participation may raise expectations that are not or cannot be satisfied. The
constant emphasis on culture may result in a constitution that is no longer
congruent with dominant international political ideas or economic forces,
widening the gap between the constitution and realities. But a proper
assessment of the impact of popular participation cannot be made if the
concept of 'people' is not disaggregated, nor without some moderation of
36 An apparent paradox about participation is worth noting: Countries with an established tradition of
democracy have less participatory processes than those without that tradition. Perhaps in the second case
there is little alternative to a highly participatory process, involving dialogue at the grassroots, because there
are few intermediate institutions, such as effective political parties, trade unions and other social and interest
groups. By the same token, by the time the process is finished, however empowering it might have been,
there is little prospect of sustaining this kind of engagement. In Kenya, to fill this gap, we gave considerable
thought to modes of continuous participation, through the constitution, in the affairs of the state, but this
was not appreciated by polticians!
37 For preliminary thoughts on this matter, see Jill Cottrell & Yash Ghai 'Seeking democratisation,
accountability and social justice: The constitution building process in Kenya' (2004, International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, forthcoming in Democratization).
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the romanticism about the 'people'. There is no such thing as the people.
There are religious groups, ethnic groups, the disabled, women, the youth,
forest people, pastoralists, sometimes 'indigenous peoples', farmers, peasants,
capitalists and workers, lawyers, doctors, auctioneers, practising, failed or
aspiring politicians, all pursuing their own agenda. They bring different
levels of understanding and skills to the process. Sometimes the composition
or procedure of constituting bodies privileges one or another of these
groups. Unless one believes in the invisible hand of the political marketplace,
not all these groups can be relied upon to produce a 'good' constitution -
certainly not the politicians. The French had a rule after the revolution: no
member of the constituent assembly could stand for elections or occupy a
public office for ten years after the adoption of the constitution. How I
longed for such a rule in Kenya!
We can see that the methods of drafting and adopting a constitution have
wide consequences. and there is the danger that an over-ambitious
constitution will be honoured more in breach than observance, and thus that
it will gradually lead to frustration and loss of legitimacy. This indeed been
been the fate of many constitutions; and perhaps it will also be that of the
1997 Thailand Constitution, the planned durability of which has turned out
to be very controversial. The United States regards it as a matter of pride that
its Constitution, having lasted more than two hundred years, is the oldest
existing constitution. Perhaps the pride is justified, but we have to remember
that formal change has been averted precisely because the Supreme Court
has altered it to suit changing mores and values (which can be done if the
people are prepared to place faith in judicial rather than popular politics).
Sometimes it is wise not to plan too far ahead, especially if the circumstances
do not allow a participatory and meaningful process of constitution-making.
This was the case in Afghanistan in 2002, where my advice that the
constitution be reviewed in five years' time, when conditions might be more
settled, was rejected. But Fiji's quasi-military constitution of 1990 provided
an automatic review within seven years and that provision led to a good
process and an infinitely better constitution, in 1997. To these and many
other critical questions of the orientation of the constitution, and the mode
of making it, there tusually are no answers in the abstract. Rather the
solutions depend on the context 38 and on what is perceived to be the
function of the constitution.
This survey demonstrates, I think, that while we use a fairly common
language and seemingly common concepts when we discuss constitutions,
"' Take the case of the review of the constitution of the Cook Islands in 1998, for which I was a
consultant: The Cook Islands had been taken into receivership, in a manner of speaking, by the Asian
Development Bank which insisted that savings should be made to the cost of operating the constitution.
Successive drafts had to be faxed to its headquarters in Manila where they would be pored over by
accountants. Replies would come back that the review committee still had to make further savings of
specified sums! Among other provisions, we had to drop the public broadcasting of parliamentary
proceedings, much to my sadness, for this was the only way people in far flung islands could keep in touch
with national affairs.
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we are in fact often talking about different things. Over centuries,
constitutions have been differently conceptualized and they have served
many purposes. They have been instruments for law and order or some
deliberate 'stirring up'; for liberation or oppression; for self-government or
co-optation; for legitimacy; for defence against imperialism; and to limit
government or to enhance its capacity to promote development or social
justice. When I assisted in the drafting of independence constitutions in the
late decolonization period (in relatively small South Pacific colonies), I
became particularly conscious of these manifold purposes of constitutions.
Mostly archipelagic, with the bulk of the population spread over a vast area,
living in traditional and separate communities, largely untouched by both
market relations and state administration, the new states themselves were
established by the constitution, which invented modalities of grouping and
of governing diverse peoples, and which created institutions which would
give them credibility as members of the international community of states. A
new national identity, transcending if not superseding particularistic,
traditional identities, had to be established or, one could almost say, decreed.
The constitution-making process was the chosen device for achieving this.
So the constitution-making process had to be fully participatory for purposes
of legitimacy, but also for creating a consciousness of belonging to a larger
entity, all pursuing the same goals. 39 There was a certain measure of irony in
giving people with little literacy or knowledge of state political systems
opportunities of fashioning their constitutions denied to the citizens of more
'advanced' countries, but these processes foreshadowed the participatory
processes that have now become de rigeur in many parts of the world. 40
Nevertheless, the task of integration through the state was handicapped by
the suspicion of a state that was too powerful (lessons leamt from the African
experience) and there was thus a preference for the constitution as 'brakes'
rather than as an 'accelerator'.
The specificity of the 'constitutional' function, and the corresponding
perceptions and reflections, have been, I trust, copiously illustrated in this
article. Communists do not think of it in the same way as democrats; social
democrats pursue different agendas through a constitution than liberal
democrats. Both the conception and purpose of constitutions in Eastern
Europe emerging from communism were quite different from those of the
independence constitutions in Africa, which were primarily concerned with
nation-building, defining an identity, and less concerned with the ideologi-
cal issues that dominated Eastern Europe. Nation-building is, at least partly,
the concern of the contemporary Afghanistan and Iraqi constitutions, but
there is also the sense of reconstruction, of building afresh, of not so much
" Those familiar with Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Orgin and Spread of
Nationalism (1983) will recognize in this the attempt at instilling a sense of nationalism in the absence of the
integrative effect of the market, state authority, and literacy.
40 have explored the role and impact of constitution-making on state formation and legitimacy in the
South Pacific in two essays, 'Constitution making and decolonisation' and 'Political consequences of
constitutions' in Yash Ghai (ed) Law, Politics and Government in the Pacific Island States (1988) 1-53.
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defining as finding a nation. Many people in developing countries see
constitutions not so much as modes of governance as charters and mandates
of fundamental change, not limiting but expanding the space for the state.
Comparative constitutional law has become mired in formalism and
pseudo-universalism, and the wonderful multiplicity of the constitution has
been lost.
